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Introduction
The Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) 
is taking on a larger role in international 
affairs. In the next few years, President 
Lee Myung‑bak hopes to transform 
South Korea into a respected middle 
power with sufficient clout to effect 
change on the global stage.1 If that can be 
achieved, it would reverse the perception 
that South Korea, plagued by insecurity, 
parochialism and the shadow of its larger 
neighbours, has failed to exert the kind of 
international influence generally expected of 
a country of its size and strength.
Indeed, it seems that Lee’s vision for a 
‘Global Korea’—a state that can rival 
other middle powers like Australia in the 
provision of peacekeeping, humanitarian 
assistance, disaster relief and post‑conflict 
stabilisation operations—has been warmly 
welcomed in many circles. Washington’s 
policymakers see great promise in Seoul’s 
new‑found activism: ‘Korea offers the best 
potential for a change in focus from narrow 
South Korea’s President Lee Myung‑bak receives military honours upon his arrival to Canberra, 5 March 2009. © Daniel Munoz—Pool/epa/Corbis
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shared interests to broad global aims’.2 And 
Australian counterparts seem to share this 
view. In April 2010, then Foreign Minister 
Stephen Smith stated that the bilateral 
relationship contained ‘great untapped 
potential’.3 On the face of it, this appears true.
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Comparing Australia and South Korea on 
paper reveals a long list of similarities: both 
are liberal democracies, longstanding allies of 
the US and active participants in key regional 
and international forums; they have a robust, 
complementary trading relationship4 with 
a free trade agreement in the pipeline; both 
have China as their largest trading partner 
and espouse a common view of most global 
security issues. Yet, despite many similarities, 
Seoul and Canberra have maintained 
an economically ‘hot’ but politically 
‘cool’ engagement.
At first blush this seems puzzling. But the lack 
of interest in a stronger strategic relationship 
is straightforward: our two countries have 
faced very different, largely exclusive strategic 
dilemmas. South Korean security policy 
has maintained a near‑myopic focus on the 
Korean Peninsula, where other middle powers 
have had very little influence. And Australia 
has been concerned primarily with its 
immediate neighbourhood and maintaining 
the centrality of the ANZUS alliance by 
supporting global US operations.
For Australia, a more comprehensive 
partnership with South Korea may be 
of increasing value, given the tectonic 
strategic shifts in our region.
So, why the sudden interest in South Korea 
as a strategic partner? How much could 
we realistically expect to gain from a 
closer relationship? Where do our shared 
strategic interests lie, and how would further 
diplomatic or military cooperation enhance 
those interests? Moreover, will South Korea be 
able to sustain its current enthusiasm for an 
enhanced global role or will its aspirations be 
checked by events closer to home?
For Australia, a more comprehensive 
partnership with South Korea may be of 
increasing value, given the tectonic strategic 
shifts in our region. If so, it should be viewed 
as a long‑term investment. Short‑term 
gains are unlikely. Our expectations 
should be clear: the Australia–South Korea 
relationship will not be a central component 
of the Asia–Pacific region’s future security 
architecture. It will be a relationship based on 
common interests, not common threats. And 
South Korea will need time to develop the 
diplomatic, military and political resolve to 
fulfil its middle power aspirations.
Based on that assessment, this paper 
advances a number of ideas about how 
we should progress the Australia–ROK 
relationship:
1. The strategic relationship will be shaped 
by the broader machinations of the 
US‑led ‘hubs and spokes’ alliance system. 
Working within this framework is the 
clearest and most constructive focus for 
the relationship.
2. The main benefits from expanding the 
relationship are diplomatic rather than 
military: regular high‑level contact 
between Australian and South Korean 
officials can allow the two countries 
to coordinate strategies for coalition 
building in regional institutions. Even 
so, incremental steps to improve 
military‑to‑military relations could yield 
significant benefits for both countries.
3. Lee Myung‑bak’s blueprint for a 
‘Global Korea’ and the expectation 
of greater Korean participation in 
nontraditional security initiatives will 
create new opportunities for collaboration. 
The Gillard Government should continue 
to support this vision through active forms 
of cooperation.
4. The 2009 Joint Statement on Enhanced 
Global and Security Cooperation outlines 
a number of expanded areas where 
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and therefore do not occupy permanent seats 
at exclusive decision‑making tables such as 
the United Nations (UN) Security Council—
they encourage others to play by the rules.
Australia, for example, has never been a 
prime mover in international security affairs. 
Instead, we’ve pursued our interests by 
being a strong supporter of the rules‑based 
order that emerged following World War II.8 
And we’ve thrown our military resources 
behind that commitment, for example in 
UN peacekeeping and stabilisation operations, 
the International Security Assistance Force 
mission in Afghanistan and the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. 
Australian diplomats have a proud record 
in building pro‑reform coalitions on a broad 
range of issues, including disarmament 
and nonproliferation, free trade and 
the environment.
South Korean leaders, conversely, have 
shied away from a more active middle 
power role, despite having adequate 
resources at their disposal for at least 
the past two decades.
South Korean leaders, conversely, have shied 
away from a more active middle power role, 
despite having adequate resources at their 
disposal for at least the past two decades. 
This is largely a by‑product of Seoul’s focus 
on North Korea, and the pattern of conflict 
and reconciliation that has dominated the 
Korean Peninsula for six decades.
But in the early stages of this new century, 
that pattern appears to be changing. 
South Korea has adopted the rhetoric of a 
more confident, outward‑looking state,9 one 
that seeks recognition of its achievements 
and greater involvement in multilateral 
institutions. It boasts a dynamic and highly 
Australia and South Korea can work 
together on security issues. Of them, 
the most important will be coalition 
building, peacekeeping and post‑conflict 
stabilisation.
5. South Korea and Australia must outline 
the extent of their common interests 
and encourage greater public support for 
further engagement.
Middle power aspirations
The definition of what constitutes a middle 
power in the contemporary international 
order is the subject of ongoing debate.5 
For our purposes, middle powers are those 
states that have a median set of capabilities 
(economic, military and diplomatic) and are 
committed to using those resources to pursue 
an active role in international affairs. They 
are sometimes called ‘second‑tier powers’ or 
‘regional security powers’. The idea that there 
is a putative class of states in between the 
great and small powers seems to survive the 
real‑world observation that size can be an 
illusive variable.
The typical middle power role is thought to 
include a preference for coalition building 
with ‘like‑minded’ countries in multilateral 
institutions, the promotion of international 
legal norms and the use of diplomatic, 
military and economic resources to achieve 
selected political outcomes.6 The pursuit 
of middle power diplomacy is also cyclical 
and dependent upon the priorities of the 
government of the day.7 Not all states 
that have the means to do so will follow 
this particular course of action: adequate 
resources are one thing, but governments 
must decide if, when and where a middle 
power agenda suits their interests.
Middle powers generally champion the 
existing order. As they lack the necessary 
power to coerce or deter the heavyweights—
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Global Korea
A middle power agenda in international 
security is consistent with President Lee’s 
blueprint for a Global Korea. Based on the core 
values of peace, justice, common prosperity, 
global mindset, and creative pragmatism, the 
Global Korea program has four main tenets:
• inter‑Korean relations based on mutual 
benefits and common prosperity
• cooperative networked diplomacy
• comprehensive and results‑oriented 
foreign policy
• future‑looking and advanced security.
competitive economy, a modern and 
professional military that already contributes 
to peacekeeping, stabilisation and anti‑piracy 
missions, and a growing official development 
assistance (ODA) program.10
It has also been a strong supporter of the 
UN. In 2006, the ROK successfully lobbied 
for a former foreign minister, Ban Ki‑moon, 
to become UN Secretary General. In 2010, 
it referred the sinking of the South Korean 
corvette Cheonan to the Security Council 
for mediation.
Figure 1: Security strategy—South Korea
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Implications of a changing regional 
security environment
Any discussion about the future of the 
Australia–ROK relationship should contain 
an analysis of the regional trends that will 
shape that interaction. The evolution of a 
new security order in Asia will determine the 
mutual strategic interests of each partner and 
the opportunities and constraints for bilateral 
cooperation. Naturally, this is a selective 
exercise. But, looking out from 2010, the 
following issues are likely to form the strategic 
parameters under which an enhanced 
Australia–ROK partnership can occur.
In the coming decades, we’re likely to see a 
more complex and contested Asian security 
order, one in which middle powers will pursue 
their interests in the shadow of increasing 
competition between a growing number of 
major powers.
Unless greatly strengthened, the 
cooperative security arrangements 
that have mushroomed in the 
post‑Cold War era, such as the Six 
Party Talks and the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, will continue to be poor 
mechanisms for resolving crises …
Short of war or military adventurism, the 
recalibration of power relativities in Asia will 
drive a steady evolution of the current order, 
rather than any abrupt upheaval. Countries 
will experience occasional periods of tension 
as new spheres of influence emerge, territorial 
disputes flare up, militaries grow more 
capable, historical grievances linger, and 
states attempt to manipulate the rules that 
govern the regional and international order.
Unless greatly strengthened, the 
cooperative security arrangements that have 
mushroomed in the post‑Cold War era, such 
At the heart of this strategy are the twin 
pillars of bilateral and multilateral security 
cooperation to mitigate the risks of a rapidly 
changing global security environment. Indeed, 
Lee has spent his first 30 months in office 
reinvigorating existing friendships—such as 
confirming the centrality of the US alliance 
in ROK foreign policy and formalising 
the China–ROK–Japan trilateral strategic 
dialogue—while at the same time pursuing 
new forms of cooperation. And Australia has 
come to the party, signing the Joint Statement 
on Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation 
with South Korea in March 2009.
The Joint Statement is essentially a list 
of middle‑power security contributions 
where cooperation can be expanded: 
counter‑terrorism, disaster recovery, 
peacekeeping, civil–military coordination, 
disarmament and nonproliferation, joint 
naval exercises, intelligence sharing, defence 
industry cooperation, and a host of other 
nontraditional security issues, including 
combating transnational crime, personnel 
exchange programs and cybersecurity.
Much of the statement is routine business. It 
reiterates some existing forms of cooperation 
and promises greater consultation on areas 
of mutual security concern. But it also 
contains the seeds of a more ambitious 
agenda—one that would see military 
forces, diplomats and police working 
cooperatively on common projects to achieve 
wider political outcomes. Advancing the 
bilateral relationship beyond intermittent 
consultation to ongoing cooperation in 
times of relative stability would be difficult 
enough. Doing so in a complex and shifting 
regional security environment will be an even 
greater challenge.
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US allies, it too has been shopping for new 
strategic partners.
The expansion of US bilateral assistance 
programs to increase the capacity of states 
like Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia to 
respond to traditional and nontraditional 
security threats is a clear part of this 
strategy.11 And the US will continue to pursue 
non‑treaty‑based forms of cooperation 
such as the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) in order to deal with emerging security 
challenges, such as illicit weapons trafficking. 
As a result of these shifts in US strategy 
in Asia, the Cold War alliance system will 
no longer be the only decisive factor in the 
strategic policy choices of either the US or its 
Asian allies.
In the absence of alternative regional 
leadership, most of our neighbours 
will welcome an ongoing role for 
the US in tempering disputes and 
preserving the regional balance 
of power.
Strategic analysts in both Canberra and Seoul 
expect that the US will remain the dominant 
power in Asia for some decades to come, 
but the rapid modernisation of the Chinese 
military, especially the navy, will challenge 
American maritime power in parts of the 
western Pacific and the South China Sea. In 
the absence of alternative regional leadership, 
most of our neighbours will welcome an 
ongoing role for the US in tempering disputes 
and preserving the regional balance of 
power. Uncertainties and anxieties about 
China’s rise may reinforce rather than 
undercut that position.12 Contrary to recent 
academic conjecture about the dawn of a 
new China‑centric security order in Asia, most 
regional policymakers will continue to view 
a balance of power that favours American 
as the Six Party Talks and the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, will continue to be poor mechanisms 
for resolving crises, and their existence will 
not diminish the enduring importance of 
bilateral alliances or the growth of bilateral 
security agreements.
The European experience of the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century showed that economic 
interdependence alone is a defective leash for 
the dogs of war. Asia’s economic and political 
dynamism has been complemented, if not 
made possible, by a predictable strategic 
environment underpinned by US primacy. 
An Asia without American leadership would 
be a much more uncertain place, one where 
geopolitical, historical and cultural rivalries 
have a freer run.
The US has lost a lot of treasure recently—in 
two costly wars and a devastating financial 
crisis—and its fiscal outlook remains 
uncertain. In the next decade, we are 
unlikely to see the US military conducting 
interventions similar to those in Kosovo, 
Somalia or Haiti, let alone operations of the 
magnitude of those in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
And there’s no candidate looking to usurp 
this global role; at most, there’ll simply be a 
period of limited or small‑scale international 
interventions. The US will still come to the aid 
of states experiencing natural crises, as it did 
in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami 
and the earthquakes in Pakistan, Haiti and 
Chile. But its footprint will be lighter and, in 
our region, others will be expected to make 
their mark.
Alliances will be one form of partnership, 
but there’ll be others as well. The GW Bush 
Administration dismissed the idea that the 
American juggernaut should be constrained 
by large coalitions and formal agreements. 
Instead, it favoured a more fluid strategy 
of niche partnerships—coalitions of the 
willing. And while the Obama Administration 
has extended olive branches to traditional 
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contribution of troops to the Vietnam War, 
Korean defence forces have been reserved for 
Korean Peninsula contingencies. The major 
powers of Northeast Asia—China, Russia, 
Japan and the US—have been instrumental in 
managing the standoff between North and 
South; middle powers, such as Australia, have 
exerted little influence.
Australia faces no such existential threat. 
As an island nation, we’re largely divorced 
from the strategic vagaries of continental 
Asia. This has allowed our defence forces 
to conduct small‑scale interventions in our 
immediate neighbourhood and to provide 
modest contributions to US operations 
overseas. This discrepancy in relative 
geostrategic positions and imperatives 
is reflected in the defence forces of each 
country, as Table 1 demonstrates.
leadership and the pursuit of national 
interests as the primary drivers of strategic 
policy choice.
Common interests
Australia and South Korea have long enjoyed a 
highly symbiotic trading relationship but—to 
be frank—not much else. The two countries 
have been largely indifferent to a more 
comprehensive bilateral security agenda. 
There are two principal reasons for this, and 
both of them have to do with exclusivity.
The first is that until recently Australia and 
South Korea maintained largely exclusive 
security interests. For more than sixty 
years, South Korea has been confronted 
by a persistent and existential threat from 
its northern neighbour. Except for a large 
Table 1: Defence forces, selected countries
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S. Korea 687,000 4,500,00 2,810 2,922 498 275 47 76 13 12
Australia 57,777 21,574 59 1,768 147 181 12 14 6 3
Northeast Asia
N. Korea 1,106,000 4,700,000 3,500+ 3,060+ 620 302 8 329+ 63 10
China 2,285,000 510,000 6,550+ 5,720+ 1,907 665 80 253 65 84
Japan 230,300 41,800 880 950 340 566 52 7 16 5
Taiwan 209,000 1,657,000 926+ 2,284 479 275 26 73 4 19
Southeast Asia
Indonesia 302,000 400,000 0 1,069 96 146 30 41 2 29
Singapore 72,500 312,500 196 1,924+ 104 80 12 23 4 4
Vietnam 455,000 5,000,000 1,315 2,400 219 91 11 38 2 6
Thailand 305,860 200,000 333 1,554 186 282 26 73 4 19
South Asia
India 1,325,000 1,155,000 4,047+ 1,882+ 655 665+ 45 28 16 17
Pakistan 617,000 No data 2,461+ 1,266 395 212 7 8 8 0
Extra-regional
USA 1,536,657 857,063 6,523 28,082 4,076 5,272 110 16 71 31
Russia 1,027,000 20,000,000 23,510+ 28,960+ 2,118 1,588 57 75 66 42+
Canada 65,722 33,967 121 1,343 97 133 15 12 4 0
Source: Australian Defence Almanac 2010–11, ASPI.
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Twenty years out from the end of the 
Cold War, that exclusivity has eroded. Building 
additional bilateral security partnerships held 
little appeal for South Korea and Australia as 
long as the US enjoyed overwhelming military 
superiority in the region. But fears that 
Washington will be unable to shape the Asian 
security environment by itself have forced 
allies to reconsider this standing convention.
In the past few years, we’ve seen 
concerted efforts to strengthen 
connections between the Australian, 
Japanese and South Korean spokes of 
the old San Francisco alliance system.
This isn’t to say that Australia or South Korea 
is looking to abrogate its alliance relations 
with the US. On the contrary, both countries 
look set to augment their bilateral relationship 
in order to offset the burdens of maintaining 
peace and stability. And Washington supports 
this initiative, reversing its Cold War dictate 
of discouraging bilateral security cooperation 
between allies.14 In the past few years, 
we’ve seen concerted efforts to strengthen 
connections between the Australian, 
Japanese and South Korean spokes of the old 
San Francisco alliance system.
The second reason is that the highly 
centralised ‘hub and spokes’ system that 
prevailed during the Cold War era was largely 
an exclusive arrangement. The US ‘extended 
deterrence’ strategy of the Cold War tightly 
bound both allies to US strategic preferences 
in return for implicit security guarantees. This 
gave Australia the confidence and leverage to 
persist with a broader regional engagement 
strategy without the need for a significant 
military build‑up or the acquisition of an 
independent nuclear deterrent.
For South Korea, US extended nuclear 
deterrence guarantees and the presence 
of American troops on its soil allowed it to 
modernise and democratise in peace. But 
Washington needed to talk Seoul, unlike 
Australia, out of developing a nuclear weapon. 
From 1968 to 1975, the country planned to 
obtain both a plant to reprocess plutonium 
from spent fuel and intermediate‑range 
missile delivery systems. Subsequent 
experiments in nuclear fuel recycling have 
kept the nuclear proliferation door slightly 
ajar.13 Nevertheless, Cold War alliance 
arrangements were on the whole successful 
in placating both South Korea and Australia, 
and as a result neither ally ventured far 
beyond its relationship with the US to secure 
its strategic interests.
The South Korean and US navies reenact the historic Inchon Landing on 15 September 2010. The event was designed to commemorate the 
60th anniversary of the operation which decisively turned the tide of the Korean War in favour of the UN forces fighting for South Korea.  
© Yonhap News Agency/epa/Corbis
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environment. For Seoul, the development of 
a truly strategic foreign policy is still a work in 
progress. Diverting resources away from an 
exclusive focus on national security issues will 
require a more stable Korean Peninsula.
Additionally, assuming greater international 
responsibilities will involve new costs and 
responsibilities. A further challenge lies in 
the need to bring the South Korean public 
on board, convincing them that a global 
middle power role is in their interests. 
Notwithstanding these constraints, both sides 
have a lot of work to do in order to overcome 
a long history of mutual indifference towards 
non‑economic forms of cooperation.
So the barriers to a more comprehensive 
security partnership between Canberra and 
Seoul are considerable. Four in particular 
stand out:
• the ongoing challenge posed by 
North Korea
• the difficulties of building a more 
integrated military capability
• the question of public support
• the relative ‘thinness’ of the existing 
bilateral relationship.
Each is discussed below.
How do you solve a problem like 
North Korea?
The Korean Peninsula has been relatively 
stable for the past few decades, but far 
from static. New uncertainties and risks 
will continue to challenge the fragile peace 
including: growing asymmetries in the 
economic and military capabilities of the ROK 
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK); China’s alliance with the DPRK and its 
dominant place in both Korean economies; 
possible regime change in Pyongyang; 
democratic politics and generational change 
in South Korea; the reshaping of US–ROK 
alliance relations; and North Korea’s military 
The 2009 Australia–ROK Joint Statement 
would have been actively encouraged 
by the US for precisely this reason. It 
capitalises on South Korea’s desires for 
greater responsibilities in international 
security and its gradual development of the 
military capabilities to sustain them. And, 
although it isn’t binding, the statement lays 
clear foundations for a stronger strategic 
relationship, one that may see the two spokes 
working in concert on a variety of secondary 
security issues.
Australian and South Korean hopes 
to deepen and broaden the strategic 
relationship between the two 
countries will be determined by the 
efforts of each partner to successfully 
navigate the regional security 
environment.
By far the most important issue for Australia 
and South Korea is the longevity of US 
primacy in a more competitive Asian security 
environment. The obligation to increase allied 
contributions to regional security should be 
seen as an opportunity, rather than as an 
encumbrance. We can both use the visibility 
and influence generated by enhanced 
strategic cooperation to reinforce our claims 
to middle power leadership in the Asia–Pacific 
region. And implementing the action plan 
outlined in the 2009 Joint Statement would 
go a long way towards rolling back the 
strategic disinterest that’s pervaded our 
bilateral relationship with South Korea.
Continuing constraints
Australian and South Korean hopes to deepen 
and broaden the strategic relationship 
between the two countries will be 
determined by the efforts of each partner to 
successfully navigate the regional security 
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that China has less leverage over Kim Jong‑il’s 
regime than many in Washington would 
hope for. And despite the occasional hints of 
a return to the negotiating table, there’s little 
hope that the fundamental tensions between 
Pyongyang and its various interlocutors in the 
Six Party Talks will be resolved anytime soon.
The reality of the Korean Peninsula, 
and the principal reason why progress 
on both denuclearisation and 
reunification is unlikely, is that the 
status quo suits the strategic interests 
of all the major players.
The reality of the Korean Peninsula, and 
the principal reason why progress on both 
denuclearisation and reunification is unlikely, 
is that the status quo suits the strategic 
interests of all the major players. China 
doesn’t want to lose a buffer state between 
itself and America’s two North Asian allies, so 
Beijing will continue to do just enough to prop 
up the dynastic regime in Pyongyang. Both 
South Korea and Japan have watched German 
reunification with great interest—and 
they don’t want to pay the enormous costs 
that reunification of the two Koreas would 
inevitably entail. Likewise, Russia doesn’t want 
to see an influx of North Korean refugees 
across its border. And Pyongyang, isolated, 
autarkic, paranoid and penniless, has just one 
trump card left in its hand—its nuclear and 
ballistic missile program. Giving it away would 
be strategic suicide—and the North Koreans 
aren’t going to do that.
Military capabilities
South Korea’s middle power aspirations 
are dependent upon its ability to defend 
itself against threats from the North. Its 
US$22.3 billion defence budget in 2009 
makes it one of the region’s major military 
brinkmanship and nuclear belligerence. Add 
to this equation a raft of other variables—the 
modernisation of China’s People’s Liberation 
Army, Sino‑US competition, changes in the 
force structures of other regional states, and 
erratic domestic political systems, to name 
a few—and the Korean problem becomes 
more complex.
President Lee has been praised for his cool 
handling of the Cheonan crisis, despite the 
fact that a multinational team blamed the 
DPRK for the deaths of the 46 ROK sailors 
on board. As with other incidents of North 
Korean provocation, the South has exercised 
patience and restraint in order to ensure the 
stability of the peninsula. But the sinking is 
a painful reminder that, in the absence of 
a definitive peace, internal anxieties about 
North Korea’s behaviour will periodically, if 
not regularly, challenge South Korea’s resolve 
to fulfil a middle power role in international 
affairs. Domestic support for a ‘Global Korea’ 
vision is likely to be low in the face of future 
attacks, and will drive debates about whether 
military resources devoted to international 
responsibilities would be better used for 
national security programs.
North Korea is also an important element 
in the simultaneously cooperative and 
competitive relationship between 
Washington and Beijing. Although the US 
supports a multilateral framework for the 
negotiation of the North Korean issue through 
the Six Party Talks (involving China, Japan, 
Russia, the US and North and South Korea), 
it wants China to lead that process. Beijing has 
made some effort to meet that expectation, 
for example by pushing and cajoling 
North Korea back to the negotiating table on 
several occasions since 2001.
But Washington remains deeply frustrated 
with the Chinese Government’s over‑cautious 
diplomatic approach. Beijing’s lack of any real 
determination in pushing the North Koreans 
towards a final negotiating position suggests 
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At this point in time, however, the ROK faces 
a number of hurdles in carrying out the 
modernisation of its defence force outlined 
in the 2020 DRP. Evaluating each of them is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but by taking 
a simple economic metric one can appreciate 
the difficulty of the task ahead.15
The current reform program is based on a 
budget for the Ministry of National Defense 
that increases steadily from 2006 through 
2020. For the 2006–2010 period, this 
translates into an increase of 9.9% per year. 
In reality, however, the average increase 
has been only 7.2%, placing the 2010 
military budget approximately US$3.1 billion 
behind schedule.16
The DRP budget timeline is based on the 
assumption that South Korea’s GDP and 
government spending will increase in parallel, 
but the global financial crisis demonstrated 
that GDP may grow at a slower rate than 
expected. And if the ROK were to suffer 
another major economic shock in the years 
to 2020, the defence portfolio would likely 
find itself competing with other government 
services for a share of the budget—a fight 
it could very well lose. To say nothing of 
the usual delays in capability development 
programs, there’s strong evidence to support 
the view that budget shortfalls will postpone, 
if not prevent, the implementation of some 
of the changes declared in the DRP. As 
one commentator noted in 2010, ‘almost 
certainly, the original DRP 2020 goals will not 
be reached’.17
Further clouding the crystal ball is the fact 
that, as conditions on the peninsula change, 
the ROK Government will be tempted 
to tinker with the DRP. For example, the 
previous administration believed that the 
Sunshine Policy would augur a peaceful era 
of inter‑Korean relations. On the basis of that 
assumption, it shifted its attention away from 
the North Korean threat to the development 
of a bluewater navy and an advanced air force. 
players, with only China and Japan spending 
a larger amount. And despite the numerical 
advantage North Korea enjoys across several 
platforms (see Table 1), South Korea is 
modernising its military while the North’s 
equipment becomes increasingly antiquated. 
Over the next ten years, the ROK aims to 
improve the qualitative characteristics of 
its military while reducing the quantity of 
military manpower and weapon systems.
And despite the numerical advantage 
North Korea enjoys across several 
platforms, South Korea is modernising 
its military while the North’s 
equipment becomes increasingly 
antiquated.
The far‑reaching 2020 Defense Reform 
Plan (DRP) is principally designed to 
replace outdated 1960s‑era weaponry 
while maintaining the ability to deal with 
contingencies involving North Korea. Much 
like Australia, South Korea will modernise 
its navy’s surface combat ships, upgrade its 
submarine force and add Aegis capability to 
naval weapons systems. Unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) will increase C4ISR capabilities 
(command, control, communications, 
computing, intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance).
The upshot would be a significant boost in 
the aggregate capabilities of the ROK military, 
allowing Seoul to reduce its reliance on the 
US for essential weapons and equipment. 
The fruits of the DRP would allow a gradual 
shift towards a broad‑based, multifaceted 
force that can contribute to a variety of 
international security missions. South Korea 
will also regain wartime control of its own 
forces from Washington in late 2015.
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a lynchpin in Obama’s global strategy and 
a vehicle for preserving US interests in 
Northeast Asia, the South Korean public 
remains sceptical about the need to assume 
that role. Devoting resources to middle power 
activism at the expense of isolating North 
Korea seems unpalatable to many.
Politics in Seoul has sharp edges. 
Unpredictable swings in public opinion—
including periods of anti‑Americanism—and 
corresponding changes in policy debates are 
common. More importantly, it seems that 
South Korean society remains deeply divided 
over a number of matters—historical, social, 
and political—that are central to a basic 
understanding of what its nation represents 
and what role it should play abroad.19 Lee 
has been successful so far in drawing 
support for his country’s pursuit of enhanced 
international leadership. But whereas the 
notion of a ‘Global Korea’ may be championed 
by members of the political elite in Seoul, the 
jury is still out about whether the idea will 
enjoy lasting popular support.
As the security situation on the peninsula 
deteriorated, however, the DRP was revised to 
target North Korea’s asymmetric capabilities 
and nuclear weaponry. This year, the sinking 
of the Cheonan has placed amendments 
to the DRP to better address the North’s 
conventional forces under the spotlight.
In other words, South Korea is suffering from 
the Goldilocks dilemma: trying to assemble 
a military that balances utility and flexibility 
for a range of different scenarios at home and 
abroad. In short, the exact composition of 
South Korea’s future force structure, and its 
ability to work alongside Australia on a range 
of nontraditional security initiatives, remain 
open questions.
Global Korea: A successful brand?
Economic power alone won’t be sufficient 
to command global influence. As one 
commentator notes, ‘those who aspire to have 
influence must have political strength and 
the ability to project influence persuasively’.18 
But for all the talk of South Korea becoming 
Leaders of the G20 countries and organizations at the G8 Summit in Toronto, Canada 27 June 2010. Among those pictured is President of South Korea 
Lee Myung‑bak (L in front row). © Justin Lane/epa/Corbis
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Unlike its conservative predecessor, the 
Rudd Government adopted multilateralism 
as a core foreign policy focus: the Asia Pacific 
Community, the Copenhagen climate 
conference, and a bid for a non‑permanent 
seat at the UN Security Council are the 
main examples of that tendency. The recent 
re‑election of the Labor Government (albeit 
with the support of several independents) 
and Rudd’s appointment as foreign minister 
will bring an element of continuity to the 
bilateral relationship, but the foreign policy 
priorities of the Gillard prime ministership 
remain to be seen.
Leadership will be crucial in guiding broader 
public support towards a closer strategic 
partnership between Canberra and Seoul. 
This will be no easy task: the reference to 
‘strong people‑to‑people ties’ in the 2009 
Joint Statement is a mild embellishment. 
The two countries have shown little interest 
in developing the types of cultural, social and 
political links that would underpin a more 
comprehensive partnership. In the words of 
one commentator, ‘Koreans think Australia is 
little more than a mine, a farm and a beach. 
Similarly, many Australians think Korea is little 
more than the home of kimchi, taekwondo, 
and occasionally, colorful parliamentary 
debate involving taekwondo.’23 Korean 
language and society are a cultural blindspot 
in the broader Australian community. The 
so‑called ‘Korean Wave’—the popularisation 
of Korean cultural products that have been 
so successful in many parts of Asia—hasn’t 
lapped against Australia’s shores.
Nowhere is the sense of cultural indifference 
more obvious than in the promotion of 
Korean language and culture in our schools. 
There isn’t a single student studying Korean 
in Year 12 in this country who is not of 
Korean descent.24 In 2009, only forty‑nine 
of 9,562 Australian primary and secondary 
schools offered Korean language studies, 
nine of them as part of the International 
For now, there are tentative signs that the 
South Korean people are warming to the 
idea of a Global Korea. The deployment 
of a Provincial Reconstruction Team to 
Afghanistan—a team of forty‑nine civilian 
aid workers and eight police officers currently 
based in Parwan that will be joined by about 
a hundred reconstruction workers and 
forty police officers—has received public 
backing.20 Two years ago, Seoul withdrew its 
personnel from Afghanistan following the 
abduction of a church group by the Taliban in 
Kandahar. That the Korean people have thus 
far supported a return to the Afghan conflict 
may stem from a growing belief that Korea 
has a national interest in contributing to 
international security, in addition to stability 
on the peninsula.21
There’s no doubt that Australia–ROK 
ties have improved in the past 
few years. 
Seoul mates?
There’s no doubt that Australia–ROK ties 
have improved in the past few years. Former 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and President 
Lee enjoyed a natural rapport.22 Just as both 
countries were instrumental in the creation 
of APEC in 1989, Rudd and Lee did a lot of the 
spadework that saw the G20 replace the G8 
as the principal international economic forum 
after the global financial crisis. In support of 
the ROK, Rudd sent five Australian defence 
experts to investigate the sinking of the 
Cheonan, and publicly condemned Pyongyang 
upon the release of the findings. These 
developments gave the bilateral relationship 
a clear focus for practical cooperation.
With the recent installation of a new 
Australian government, however, and 
Lee set to step down as president in 2012, 
there’s a danger of losing momentum. 
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Baccalaureate course for international 
students.25 There’s an acute lack of Korean 
language teaching resources: the national 
cohort of Korean language teachers in 
Australian schools totals sixty‑nine, few 
enough to fit into a large classroom.26
There’s also a mismatch in the general 
warmth expressed by each population 
towards the other, arguably stemming 
from the fact that ‘Brand Australia’ has a 
stronger presence in South Korea. In a 2006 
survey about international perceptions, 
South Koreans gave Australia their warmest 
ranking—65 degrees—out of fifteen 
countries.27 Australia is a popular destination 
for South Koreans visiting for study or 
vacation. More than 190,000 Koreans visited 
Australia in 2008–09, while in the same 
period 19,350 student visas were issued to 
ROK citizens.28
Conversely, in the BBC 2010 World Poll, 
35% of Australian respondents viewed 
South Korea as having a positive influence 
in world affairs, while 26% saw it as having 
a negative influence. This ambivalence was 
echoed in the 2009 Lowy Institute annual 
survey of Australian public opinion, in which 
South Korea was given a slightly ‘warm’ rating 
of 53 degrees. Ironically, Australians feel as 
close to democratic, pro‑US South Korea as 
they do to autocratic China (both countries 
share a 53 degree rating).
Ideas for enhanced cooperation
Notwithstanding these various hurdles, 
the potential gains from an enhanced 
Australia–ROK partnership would be sizeable. 
Building better habits of security dialogue and 
cooperation, however, will require a carefully 
balanced assessment of where and when our 
mutual interests coincide. And, as this paper 
has argued, expectations should be tempered 
by the realities of the complex issues at play in 
regional security dynamics.
Three broad areas of security cooperation 
stand out for consideration:
• enhanced cooperation in regional 
security forums
• assistance with post‑conflict and 
stabilisation operations
• building the existing spokes of the 
San Francisco alliance system into a 
stronger quadrilateral framework.
Cooperating in regional institutions
The US has at various times been chided 
for not paying sufficient attention to our 
part of the world. President Bush pursued 
a somewhat ‘sporadic’ approach to the 
region29 but the Obama Administration has 
made a determined effort to overcome the 
diplomatic neglect of the Bush years, stepping 
up its engagement with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), developing 
new and existing relationships, and signalling 
its intention to join the East Asia Summit 
(EAS) in 2011. We’re likely to see more rather 
than less American involvement in our region 
in the coming years, and that’s a good thing: 
the regular dispatch of high‑ranking US 
officials to the region will make it easier for 
South Korea, Australia and the US to influence 
the process of order building in Asia.
The benefits of Australian and 
South Korean participation in 
the region’s cooperative security 
mechanisms are clear …
The benefits of Australian and South Korean 
participation in the region’s cooperative 
security mechanisms are clear: middle 
powers can exercise leverage in such 
organisations, particularly when they work 
cooperatively beforehand. ASEAN, its offshoot 
arrangements (the ASEAN Regional Forum 
and EAS) and APEC can be useful vehicles for 
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preventive diplomacy and confidence‑building 
measures. Regular consultations between 
ministers and other senior officials will help 
create a mutual agenda that can be used to 
shape order‑building and policy choices.
Inside these institutional structures, 
South Korea and Australia can lead small 
coalitions of like‑minded countries to achieve 
specific foreign and security policy outcomes. 
Institutional cooperation can also preserve 
US influence in regional discussions and 
encourage states to accede to the norms and 
rules of the regional order. A greater emphasis 
on multilateral cooperation may also offset a 
growing tendency to split regional diplomacy 
along a Washington–Beijing axis.
Nevertheless, the disadvantages of these 
immature security architectures are also clear: 
none has been an effective mechanism for 
crisis management and conflict resolution. 
Regional states have differing views on 
what constitute security issues and what 
action should be taken to address them. This 
weakness will make it difficult for institutions 
to anticipate and cradle order‑defining 
challenges. In fact, competition within and 
between institutions may hinder rather 
than help the emergence of a more effective 
regional security arrangement.30
Encouraging ASEAN members to adopt a 
workshop rather than a talkshop approach—
to generate a clear, material commitment 
to achieving shared security objectives—is 
vital for the region. But ASEAN’s track record 
won’t fill Australian and South Korean 
policymakers with confidence about that 
happening soon. For these reasons, Australia’s 
and South Korea’s respective foreign policies 
will continue to employ a ‘dual track’ 
strategy that:
• encourages meaningful US participation 
in reforming regional institutions
• continues to pursue independent, bilateral 
agendas with key partners.
The first approach will be emphasised 
when the regional security environment 
is relatively stable, allowing each country 
to focus on coalition building, while 
alliance arrangements will be front and 
centre when that environment shows 
signs of stress. The second is a necessary 
hedge against continued weakness in 
multilateral institutions.
Assisting with post‑conflict stabilisation 
and peacekeeping operations
South Korea has identified as a priority 
an increased role in peacekeeping and 
post‑conflict stabilisation missions. 
ROK troops exercising and training in 
Australia for missions of that type may 
lead to bilateral cooperation in future 
contingencies—particularly those that occur 
in the so‑called ‘arc of instability.’ ROK help 
in stabilising our immediate environs would 
be welcomed in Australia. And participation 
in these niche areas has been an effective 
strategy for middle powers to make concrete 
contributions to international security and 
thereby increase their international clout and 
visibility: a clear incentive for South Korea. 
Akin to Canberra’s whole‑of‑government 
approach to nation building, South Korea’s 
stabilisation efforts and ODA projects could 
be deployed in tandem to support the various 
phases of reconstruction and rehabilitation.
The Lee Government has already made 
good on its commitment to increase its 
involvement in these types of missions: it 
began deploying a Provincial Reconstruction 
Team to the Afghan province of Parwan in July 
this year. South Korea also plans to treble its 
ODA budget, from approximately US$1 billion 
in 2009 to more than US$3 billion by 2015.31 
As mentioned in the 2009 Joint Statement, 
Australia could help South Korea maximise 
its resources by offering enhanced training to 
ROK personnel in the areas of peacekeeping, 
civil–military coordination, international 
police deployment, and disaster management. 
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Australia should consider providing additional 
funding to the Asia Pacific Civil‑Military 
Centre of Excellence based in Queanbeyan to 
support that work.
Disaster relief is another area where 
cooperation can be enhanced. South Korea 
made admirable contributions to the 
disaster relief operations that followed the 
2004 Boxing Day tsunami in Southeast Asia, 
but its absence from US‑led efforts was 
conspicuous, given Australia, Japan and India’s 
participation. If nothing else, operating within 
a multilateral framework alongside other US 
allies may have raised South Korea’s profile in 
the international community.
The Korean International Cooperation 
Agency (KOICA) is developing a humanitarian 
response budget and capacity to deliver 
humanitarian assistance to areas afflicted by 
natural or manmade disasters. This is an area 
where Australia’s aid agency, AusAID, could 
share its experiences of disaster recovery 
coordination and international humanitarian 
efforts more broadly. Late last year, the 
Australian and the Korean foreign affairs 
departments signed a memorandum of 
understanding outlining potential areas of 
collective contributions to development goals 
and cooperation within the Organisation for 
Economic Co‑operation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee and 
other steering groups.32
Strengthening the spokes
The 2009 Joint Statement mirrors many of 
the expanded areas of cooperation in the 
2007 Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on 
Security Cooperation. We may eventually 
see the US, Japan, South Korea and Australia 
promoting inter‑alliance coordination on a 
quadrilateral basis. And if we’re to accept 
greater costs in order to shoulder the burden 
of these alliance commitments, it would 
make sense to sit down and decide how the 
relationships between the three ‘spokes’ can 
be better managed—and, where appropriate, 
integrated—to achieve shared objectives.
Japan and Australia have a strong track record 
of shared peace‑building and reconstruction 
efforts in Cambodia, East Timor and Iraq, and 
after the Boxing Day tsunami. Each nation’s 
defence forces have also strengthened their 
interoperability with US forces to carry out 
coordinated responses to disaster recovery, 
maritime security and related nontraditional 
security initiatives. These experiences could 
serve as a constructive template for increased 
bilateral and trilateral coordination efforts 
with South Korean forces. And cooperation 
involving all three allies may establish a 
regional precedent for other institutions and 
Asian actors to take their broader regional 
security responsibilities more seriously.
Quadrilateral coordination between the 
US, Australia, Japan and South Korea is 
already occurring under the auspices of the 
PSI initiative. In mid‑September, Australia 
hosted the first Regional Operational Experts 
Group meeting of nineteen Asia–Pacific PSI 
members. And in October, the US, Australia 
and Japan conducted a maritime interdiction 
exercise near the port of Busan in South 
Korea. If sustained, South Korea’s middle 
power aspirations will provide a range of 
opportunities for further ‘needs based’ 
quadrilateral coordination.
Conclusion
As South Korea’s capacity and desire to play a 
greater role in international security increase, 
new forms of cooperation with Australia will 
help prepare the country for participation 
in missions off the Korean Peninsula. This 
could lead to a range of mutual benefits. 
The modest vision for broadened security 
cooperation outlined in this report has been 
made possible by political commitments made 
in each country to find new ways to manage 
the region’s evolving security environment. 
Australia–South Korea cooperation can play 
a small but productive role in this regard, 
and should be pursued vigorously by the 
Gillard Government.
18 Australia and South Korea: Middle power cooperation and Asian security
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